Enhancing reflection: An interpersonal exercise in ethics education by Verkerk, M.A. et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Enhancing reflection: An interpersonal exercise in ethics education





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2004
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Verkerk, M. A., Lindemann, H., Maeckelberghe, E., Feenstra, E., Hartoungh, R., & de Bree, M. (2004).
Enhancing reflection: An interpersonal exercise in ethics education. Hastings Center Report, 34(6), 31-38.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3528175
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
H A S T I N G S  C E N T E R  R E P O R T 31November-December 2004
If there ever was a Golden Age in which the kind-ly village doctor knew best and his grateful pa-tients unquestioningly accepted his decisions, it
may safely be said that we are no longer in it. Today’s
health care professionals provide care in highly orga-
nized and complex surroundings, where they en-
counter not only patients, but other professionals
whose values do not necessarily accord with their
own. These changes in the way the health care sys-
tem functions have consequences for those who are
working in it. To adapt to the new environment, a
good professional must not only exhibit the techni-
cal proficiency that allows her to do things right—
she must also do the right thing. She needs to be
aware of her own professional norms and values; to
be able to express them to her colleagues, her pa-
tients, and their families; and to work together with
these other actors to provide ethically responsible
care. In short, if professionals are to do the right
thing, they must develop a refined capacity for moral
reflection.
We have developed a tool for practical ethics in-
struction aimed at helping professionals to do just
that. The tool has been designed to be flexible
enough to be used not only in medicine, but also in
a number of other venues, including business, archi-
tecture, journalism, and the like. While resources
featuring the idea of reflection have proved popular
in professional ethics education,1 ours differs from
them in that it is based on an expressive and collab-
orative conception of morality in which responsibil-
ities are negotiated through narrative.
The most popular philosophical picture of moral-
ity is the one that is associated with utilitarianism,
deontological (especially Kantian) ethics, or social
contract theory. As the philosopher Margaret Urban
Walker has usefully pointed out, it is a picture of a
compact, impersonally action-guiding code, within
or for an agent. According to this picture, morality is
knowledge, the core of which is essentially theoreti-
cal, explicitly stateable, highly general, and systemat-
ically unified. Its essential function is to tell the agent
what to do. The role of the philosopher, as this pic-
ture portrays it, is that of constructing, testing, and
refining code-like theories that exhibit the core of
moral knowledge.2
There are no moral cookbooks—no algorithms for whipping up moral confections to suit every
occasion. But more modest and flexible tools might still be useful for practical ethics. One team
describes how professionals can be taught to use a framework for understanding moral problems.
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The notion of morality as codifi-
able knowledge has increasingly come
under fire from contemporary moral
philosophers.3 We join them in reject-
ing it. Instead, we endorse the view
that morality is something we do to-
gether. It is “a socially embodied
medium of understanding and adjust-
ment in which people account to
each other for the identities, the rela-
tionships, and the values that define
their responsibilities.”4 It is a way of
expressing who we are, of understand-
ing others, and holding others and
ourselves to moral account. 
Walker describes morality as fun-
damentally interpersonal. As she puts
it, “It arises out of and is reproduced
or modified in what goes on between
or among people. In this way, morali-
ty is collaborative; we construct and
sustain it together.”5 On Walker’s
view of morality, moral life requires
participation in and collaboration
with a system of accountability and
responsibility that is negotiated
(sometimes contested) and whose
outcome is meant to be a life that is
decently habitable for all. But because
many of our responsibilities are so-
cially assigned, it is important to be
able to assess these assignments and
change them at need. Doing this,
Walker argues, requires us to make
use of narrative constructions that
represent ourselves, our relationships,
and our values.6 Because narratives of
identity, relationships, and value play
such a central role in our moral lives
together, moral competence crucially
depends on narrative competence.
Narratives are not only a factual ac-
count of reality, but are also an inter-
pretation of reality as well. Awareness
of these narrative resources gives us
insight into the way we structure the
social reality in which we take part. 
Using this social and collaborative
view of morality, we contend that
moral competence is a matter of de-
veloping a set of skills, namely, seeing
what is morally relevant in a given sit-
uation; knowing the particular point
of view from which one sees it; un-
derstanding that others who are in-
volved may see it somewhat different-
ly; and, with those others, responding
well to what one sees. 
Here we can speak of the moral
shape of a situation and the responsi-
bilities that are attached to it. The
moral shape can be thought of as the
overall configuration of the ethically
relevant particulars of the situation.
This configuration involves looking
at, for example, the moral meaning of
a particular patient’s refusal to eat in
the context of her fears about her
prognosis; her daughter’s continued
attempts at spoon feeding; the inop-
erable nature of her cancer; her hus-
band’s emotional distance; the nurse’s
horror at the thought of letting the
patient starve to death; the oncolo-
gist’s reluctance to override the pa-
tient’s wishes; and the family practi-
tioner’s impossibly busy schedule.
Seen as a whole, these factors consti-
tute a reason for responding in this
way rather than that one. The de-
scription of the situation is best un-
derstood as a narrative whose accura-
cy rests on its following the shape that
the situation has. Like other stories,
this one can be told badly: the hus-
band’s emotional distance, perhaps,
might be assigned too much impor-
tance in the story, while other signifi-
cant details, without which the story
makes no sense, might be misplaced,
distorted, or omitted altogether. Told
well, however, the story models the
contours of the moral situation, and it
is the persuasiveness of the story that
justifies the caregivers’ response.7
The professional needs to develop
the skills to see a moral shape, to un-
derstand the difference between her
own perspective and that of others,
and to respond well to what is there
to be seen, if she is to become 
professionally competent. Profession-
al competence requires more than
meeting the needs of clients with
technical proficiency; it also involves
professional integrity, which we un-
derstand as reliable accountability: es-
tablishing or maintaining one’s relia-
bility in matters involving one’s pro-
fessional commitments and services.8
Our aim is to foster professional com-
petence by enhancing the ability of
professionals to engage in moral re-
flection on their practice. 
Professional practices, of course,
endure over time, which means that
their practitioners may be guided by
the thought that “this is the way we
always do it.” These ways of doing
embody implicit norms and values
that guide professionals’ actions just
as much as more explicitly formulated
norms and values do. And because
these practices are socially shared,
those who engage in them must learn
to be reliably accountable to others
for their own sense of what is right
and good as they respond to the
client’s needs. Accountability is a cru-
cial part of the outcome of moral re-
flection on the practice. Enhanced
moral competence, then, improves
one’s ability to practice one’s profes-
sion with integrity.
We have developed a tool for en-
hancing the ability of people to en-
gage in moral reflection of their re-
spective professions. Unlike tools that
can be (and too often are) applied in a
rote and unimaginative way to moral
problems that have already been iden-
tified as in need of repair, this one is
not so much intended to fix anything
as to offer practitioners a framework
for understanding. We proceed by
means of a three-step process. The
first step helps professionals attain a
heightened moral sensitivity to the
vulnerabilities, values, and responsi-
bilities they encounter in their
work—a sensitivity acquired by iden-
tifying and developing a point of view
that can be used as a touchstone for
decisions about the best way of pro-
ceeding. The second step helps them
to understand that they are a part of a
practice that involves multiple per-
spectives and positions. This means
that their beliefs need not be the only
source of moral reasoning: others may
have different ideas with merit of
their own. Finally, the third step helps
them appreciate that they are partici-
pants in a socially shared practice that
is partly constituted and re-created by
their own collective actions. 
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The Reflection Enhancement
Tool
The three steps of the instructionaltool—initial reflection, guided re-
flection, and mapping responsibilities
—follow each other in sequence. Ini-
tial reflection consists of a reaction to
a case presentation; guided reflection
involves a critical examination of the
morally salient particulars of the case;
and mapping responsibilities is a mat-
ter of reordering one’s own (profes-
sional) position in the practice of
daily work. 
The aim of the tool is not to give a
protocol that reliably produces a
moral solution to a case, but to en-
hance awareness of the many moral
aspects of the daily practice in which
professionals operate. Although we
think that one instructional session
will give the students some idea of
how to proceed, we recommend mul-
tiple sessions.9 The particular advan-
tage of the tool is that it is flexible
enough to be of genuine use to people
at different levels of ethical sophistica-
tion, and it is delicate enough to cap-
ture the nuances of complex situa-
tions.
Initial Reflection
The instructor presents a case—forexample, heart-valve replacement
surgery for a noncooperative heroin
addict in the care of several profes-
sionals with different opinions about
how to proceed—that circles around
a puzzling moral situation. The case
need not be a moral dilemma, where
“dilemma” is defined as a conflict be-
tween contradictory moral considera-
tions. In a dilemma, the contradictory
considerations are often plainly visi-
ble, but there are other moral situa-
tions in which things are not so clear.
It may be difficult to see what is
morally at issue, and this uncertainty
can result in bad feelings or friction
among team members. To help pro-
fessionals understand that morality is
not confined merely to ethical dilem-
mas—that indeed, their routine daily
practice is shot through with norms,
values, and responsibilities, not all of
which are easy to see—the group
might be encouraged to present a case
or a memorable situation out of their
own professional experience. 
After presenting the case, the in-
structor asks the professionals, “What
do you think, and why?” The profes-
sionals are asked to write down their
individual reactions. The reason for
this step is that people’s initial re-
sponse to a case—whether to solve it,
offer an initial intuition about it, or
wonder why it has been presented—
gives the instructor an impression of
how they think and at the same time
forces the professionals to examine
the situation critically. Writing down
the initial response shields the partici-
pants from the temptation to hide be-
hind the opinion of others. We do not
recommend, however, that profes-
sionals write at great length. A short
description of their opinion of the
case or of the moral difficulties they
discern is enough. In this stage of the
process, group interaction is not yet
desired, as the focus is on helping the
professional to take responsibility for
his or her own moral point of view.
Guided Reflection
In the second phase of the exercise, adiscussion is initiated. The profes-
sionals are asked to engage in a con-
versation in which they respond to
the case, using their written notes. To
facilitate and structure this conversa-
tion, a heuristic that we have dubbed
“The Reflection Square”10 is intro-
duced, but it is only one of three es-
sential items in the phase of guided
reflection. The interaction between
the members of the group and the
role of the instructor is equally impor-
tant. The instructor begins by dis-
cussing the four dimensions of profes-
sionalism as represented by the quad-
rants of the Reflection Square. 
Social norms are socially prevalent
normative and cultural understand-
ings—professional codes, laws, moral
beliefs that are held in common, so-
cial background. (The instructor may
have to teach the professionals what
the relevant laws are, or point out
prevalent understandings.)
Consequences are the effect of social
structures and practices on people’s
lives—the consequences for people in
general or for specific people in spe-
cific social situations. Consequences
are closely related to power relations
(think of the consequences for racial
minorities of living in a racist culture,
or for women of living in societies
that systemically privilege the inter-
ests of men) and hence with social
norms. (The instructor may have to
point out the various ways in which
consequences are relevant to moral re-
flection about a specific case.)
The instructor begins by asking
one of the professionals to report her
response to the opening case—in our
example, the case of the uncoopera-
tive heroin addict. The instructor
writes this response in the appropriate
quadrant and then asks the profes-
sional how that response coheres with
the considerations to be examined in
the other three quadrants. So, for ex-
ample, if the initial response is, “I
would give her the surgery even
though I know she’s not going to take
care of herself,” the instructor records
that response in the “actions” quad-
rant. The instructor might then move
to the “core values and beliefs” quad-
The aim is not to give a protocol that 
produces moral solutions, but to enhance 
awareness of the many moral aspects of the
daily practice in which professionals operate.
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rant and ask the professional, “Is that
because you’re committed to the
value of respect for patient autono-
my?” As the professional reflects on
this question, she perhaps concludes
that it isn’t so much patient autono-
my that moved her to respond as she
did, but commitment to the patient’s
well-being. That in turn allows the
instructor to invite the professional to
reflect on her other moral values and
how they might shape her thinking
about her patients. 
Next, the instructor might turn to
the “social norms” quadrant, asking,
“Okay, but you aren’t the only player
here. What about the law (or the pro-
fessional code, or the hospital’s poli-
cies)?” If the professional answers,
“My hospital has very strict rules
about wasting resources,” the instruc-
tor might reply, “How does that work
in terms of the case?” or “What does
that mean here?” This draws the pro-
fessional’s attention to the “conse-
quences” quadrant. After thinking it
over, the professional might say, “I’ve
noticed that they’re much more con-
cerned about wasting resources when
the patient is poor, black, and a drug
addict,” and she might offer an anec-
dote to give the others a fuller sense of
what she means. It is important dur-
ing the discussion in this phase of the
exercise that the professional be guid-
ed to reflect on all four quadrants. 
The aim of this phase is for the
professional to learn to think about
her professional identity in terms of
the Reflection Square. Here we are
interested in the professional’s critical
examination of her own views as they
are embodied in her core beliefs and
expressed by how she has acted in the
past. But because she is always de-
fined in relation to others, she cannot
know herself fully without weighing
her views and actions against the
moral and social understandings that
guide the actions of others in her
community and the consequences of
these understandings for those with
whom she interacts. So the profes-
sional is asked to assess each consider-
ation in light of the other three. Hav-
ing arrived at coherence among her
beliefs about all four types of consid-
erations, the professional has a reflec-
tive sense of her own identity, both
morally and professionally. The
group’s role in this phase of the exer-
cise is Socratic: group members pose
questions to the professional that
clarify her thinking. This also implies
a second role for the group: listening
carefully to what the professional
says.
In the light of her new-found
knowledge about herself, the profes-
sional is now asked to weave the ele-
ments of the situation involving the
heroin addict and the heart valve
surgery into her own retelling of the
case—a retelling that may present
morally significant details that the
initial case presentation did not in-
clude, remove elements of the story
that are misleading or irrelevant, or
assign certain particulars of the case a
greater or lesser importance than they
had in the original presentation. Her
narrative captures the situation’s
moral shape as she sees it, and the
model of the shape shows her how
she should respond. Since the story is
her story of the noncompliant pa-
tient, told from her point of view, it
represents not only how she under-
stands the situation, but also who she
understands herself to be. These un-
derstandings are the crucial first step,
because responsibilities are often at-
tached to identities—especially, per-
haps, to professional identities. Put
another way, knowing who you are
can usually tell you something about
what you must, may, or may not do,
for the norms that inhere in your
identity both guide your actions and
let others know what they may legiti-
mately expect from you.
Depending on the interaction
within the group and the richness of
the conversation, the instructor
might now turn to another profes-
sional and take him all around the
Reflection Square, using the same
sort of question-and-answer tech-
nique, encouraging group discussion,
and then asking him to retell the
story of the case. The instructor re-
peats this exercise until she is satisfied
that the case has been discussed thor-
oughly before moving on to the next
phase of the instruction.
Professionals who engage in the
guided reflection phase will, we
think, become aware of the values
and beliefs that are part of their pro-
fessional identity. At the same time,
they will begin to perceive the differ-
ences between their own responses
and the responses of their fellow pro-
FIGURE 1. THE REFLECTION SQUARE
The moral agent in this schema might be a person, a group with a professional
identity, or a corporation. For simplicity's sake we model this agent as a person
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fessionals—differences that arise
from, for example, people’s different
experiences, the importance they at-
tribute to different values, and the
different viewpoints that arise from
different social positions. Proficiency
with the Reflection Square enables
the professionals to understand that
they are a part of a practice that in-
volves multiple perspectives and posi-
tions, and to attain a heightened
moral sensitivity to the vulnerabili-
ties, values, and responsibilities they
encounter in their work.
Mapping Responsibilities
Once professionals are madeaware of their own beliefs and
how these can differ from the beliefs
of others, they are ready to reflect on
their position within the broader
moral picture. The point of this phase
is to teach professionals how to estab-
lish, re-establish, or maintain their
professional integrity as they respond
to the client’s needs. To do this, they
need to become aware of their place
in relation to others, get an overall
understanding of the moral landscape
of a given professional interaction,
and learn how to negotiate responsi-
bilities with others. Some of these re-
sponsibilities will be very clear and
have been codified or written down in
black-letter law. Others are tied to the
identity of the professional and the
power that is attached to this identity.
Yet another source of responsibilities
may be the significance that a profes-
sional gives to his or her position, or
that others attribute to this position.
To become aware of the way re-
sponsibilities are negotiated and the
way beliefs and values play a part in
this process, the professionals are once
more guided through the Reflection
Square. The instructor could begin
this phase of the exercise in one of
two ways, depending on the composi-
tion of the group. 
Monodisciplinary negotiations. Sup-
pose the group consists solely of one
kind of professional: they are all doc-
tors, or corporate executives, or
lawyers. The instructor asks one of
them to present a case that raises
questions about her own professional
responsibilities—perhaps a case in
which an immigration lawyer won-
ders whether she ought to accede to
her client’s insistence that she pursue
every avenue of appeal. Care should
be taken that the presented case is in-
telligible to all professionals in the
group.
Let us imagine that as the lawyer
goes through the guided reflection,
she comes to see that her unwilling-
ness to pursue every avenue of appeal
for every client is based on the value
of not giving clients false hope; her
professional track record reflects this
unwillingness. But she also comes to
see that others have reasons for pursu-
ing every possible legal avenue:
lawyers in her practice are motivated
by financial considerations, and cer-
tain activist groups believe that
lawyers ought to sustain their clients
as long as possible. Moreover, she re-
alizes that she experiences the force of
social pressures to be a successful
lawyer, to achieve status in the profes-
sion, to win, and so on. 
Turning once more to the Reflec-
tion Square, the instructor now shows
the lawyer that other people’s identi-
ties and wider social forces put pres-
sure on her integrity. The instructor
explains that integrity can be thought
of as a kind of reliable accountabili-
ty—an ability to be counted on in the
ways that matter morally for how the
individual as a professional responds
to others. In the preceding phase, the
other lawyers, too, will have worked
their way around the Reflection
Square, and they may have discovered
that they all have somewhat different
moral identities. The final phase is
where responsibilities have to be
mapped. Each member of the group
must now negotiate with the others to
try to come to some kind of under-
standing about what she is responsi-
ble for, and to whom. 
The instructor puts the profession-
als into small groups of no more than
six people, telling them that their task
is to try to arrive at a group consensus
regarding the resolution of the case.
One member of the group plays the
role of the client, because the client’s
perspective is just as important as the
attorneys’ in arriving at a joint sense
of what the professionals ought to do.
Another acts as a scribe, writing down
on a fresh Reflection Square the
group’s collective understanding of
the core values, actions, social norms,
and consequences that have a bearing
on the case. The instructor’s role is to
observe, intervening only if she sees
the group veer away from its task. As
the group works its way around the
Reflection Square, an individual may
see that his self-perception misses
something important about who he is
and what he therefore must do: “I
don’t have a vivid enough sense of
how much people need to be able to
hope.” Others might conclude, in the
light of what he reveals about himself,
that they need to revise their own self-
understandings: “I’m starting to won-
der if it’s loyalty to my client that
makes me push on like this, or if I just
hate losing.” This is what we mean by
negotiation: not bargaining in the
hope of achieving some sort of advan-
tage, but a process of becoming intel-
ligible to one another so that all par-
ties can see who is taking responsibil-
ity for what, who is deflecting respon-
sibility, who assigns it, who accepts it,
and so on.11 The end result of this
mapping is that the professional can
reliably account to the others for who
he is and what he stands for.
Once responsibilities have been
mapped with the help of the Reflec-
tion Square, the small group con-
structs, together, the story of how
they ought to respond to the client.
This is a forward-looking story of
how to achieve an outcome that
everyone can endorse, and what that
outcome will mean to each of the par-
ties involved. Whereas the story con-
structed in the guided reflection stage
of the exercise was a story about the
morally puzzling situation and the in-
dividual professional’s identity, this
story is about the resolution of the sit-
uation and the moral identity of the
professionals as a group.
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Multidisciplinary negotiations. If
the professionals are members of a
multidisciplinary team—say, a health
care team consisting of nurses, physi-
cians, and social workers—the in-
structor can ask one of them to pre-
sent a case that involves a number of
different professional roles. The case
might, for example, concern whether
or how to treat a baby with very low
birth weight. Again, the instructor
puts the professionals into small
groups, and again, someone plays the
role of the client—in this case, the
baby’s parent. Again, one member of
the group acts as a scribe, writing
down on a fresh Reflection Square
the group’s collective understanding
of the values, actions, social norms,
and consequences that have a bearing
on the case. The role of the instructor
is again to observe, intervening only if
the group veers off task.
The difference is that in multidis-
ciplinary negotiations, not all the pro-
fessionals have the same responsibili-
ties. In the course of the discussion,
the neonatologist in the group might
express his conviction that he must
do everything possible to preserve the
baby’s life. The NICU nurse might be
concerned about how well the parents
are dealing with the child’s hospital-
ization. The social worker might
worry about the burden of care on
the family if the child survives to dis-
charge. Since the health care team
must collaborate in caring for this
child, each team member must rene-
gotiate his professional identity in
light of who the others are and the
values they stand for. Like monodisci-
plinary negotiations, interdisciplinary
negotiations involve a process of be-
coming intelligible to one another,
but here, the roles of doctor, nurse,
social worker, and others must be co-
ordinated. 
When the responsibilities have
been mapped, the small group con-
structs the forward-looking story of
their response to the client and what
this will mean for everyone involved.
Ideally, the story lays out the actions
of each of the different professionals
and how they fit together in the over-
all picture of the encounter among
the baby, its family, and the health
care team. In this way the team mem-
bers may come to a shared moral un-
derstanding of who can be counted
on for what, and how that con-
tributes to the overall resolution of
the situation. Perfect harmony of
opinion may elude the team. Yet even
if disagreement persists, the members
of the group may discover that they
have come to understand why they
disagree.
Theoretical Background
On a social and collaborative viewof morality, the assignment, ac-
ceptance, appropriation, and deflec-
tion of responsibilities make up an in-
terpersonal practice through which
we become morally intelligible to one
another. Given that responsibilities
are defined by who we are, our con-
nections to others, and what we care
about, the negotiation of responsibili-
ties involves three kinds of narratives:
stories of identity, relationship, and
value.
Stories of identity. Personal identi-
ties, understood as answers to the
question, Who am I? can be thought
of as fragments and tissues of stories
that cluster around what we take to
be our own or others’ most important
acts, experiences, characteristics,
roles, relationships, and commit-
ments. They are narrative under-
standings formed out of the interac-
tion between one’s self-concept and
others’ sense of who one is.12 Many of
the stories in the narrative tissue that
constitutes an identity are first-person
stories—those depict “me” from my
own point of view. But as none of us
has total control over who we are or
want to be, a number of the stories in
that tissue are third-person stories—
those that other people use to make
sense of us. And because the thing
that personal identities need to make
sense of is a life over time, the depic-
tion cannot be thought of as a snap-
shot that only shows who someone is
in a given moment. Instead, an iden-
tity consists of stories that weave to-
gether one moment with the next
moment and the moment after that,
capturing the ways we change as well
as the ways in which we stay the
same. 
Personal identities function as
counters in our social transactions, in
that they convey understandings of
what those who bear them are expect-
ed to do. Moreover, identities also
stand surrogate for how those who
bear them may be treated. Personal
identities make intelligible to us,
then, not only how other people are
supposed to act, but how we are sup-
posed to act with respect to them.
From a first-person perspective, per-
sonal identities function in much the
same way. I treat myself with con-
tempt or respect depending on who I
think I am, and out of that narrative-
ly constructed sense of myself I also
establish certain expectations for how
I ought to behave in the future. But
the fit between my identity and my
agency goes in both directions: while
it is true that I act out of the tissue of
stories that constitute my sense of
who I am, it is equally true that I ex-
press who I am by how I act. In fact,
my actions are important criteria for
assessing the accuracy of my self-con-
ception. 
Let us suppose, for example, that
although I am morally committed to
empathic listening, when I am with
my heroin-addicted patient I do all
the talking. There is reason to doubt,
in this respect, that the stories I con-
tribute to my professional identity are
credible ones. If the other profession-
als in the group can point out to me
that there seems to be a disconnect
between the “core beliefs and values”
quadrant and the “action” quadrant
in my use of the Reflection Square, I
may come to see that I do not really
understand myself as well as I
thought I did. I will then have to up-
root some of the stories that consti-
tute my sense of who I am and re-
place them with other stories that
more accurately represent me to my-
self.
Stories of relationship. Stories of re-
lationship are ethically significant for
many reasons, not least because our
relationships to others often dictate
what we are responsible for. The fact
that you and I have a particular sort
of history together might make it rea-
sonable for you to depend on me for
something and reasonable for me to
believe that you do in fact depend on
me for that thing. It is then morally
important for me to acknowledge our
history, the present state of the rela-
tionship, and our possible or probable
future together, since the relationship
shows me what I owe you, why I owe
it, and whether I have any latitude in
how or when I discharge my obliga-
tion.13 Sometimes my responsibilities
are role-related, and then it is the role
that sets up expectations on the part
of those with whom I am in relation-
ship. The backward-looking stories of
my relationship to you can show me
not only what I owe you, but also
how we got into this situation where
something is owed. Sideways-looking
stories can show me who else has re-
sponsibilities here, who will be affect-
ed by what I do, and the nature of the
context in which I do it. And for-
ward-looking stories display the pos-
sibilities for how, or perhaps whether,
you, I, and the others will go on in
the future, and what that going on
will mean for all of us.
The immigration lawyer of our
earlier example will see no disconnect
between how she has filled in the first
two quadrants of the Reflection
Square: her actions reflect her values
regarding the wrongness of giving her
clients false hope. But when she
moves to the other two quadrants,
she may find that a relationship with
a particular client gives her reasons to
pursue his case aggressively. The “so-
cial norms” quadrant, for example,
might show her that her history with
this client, a gay man, has been
strained by her unthinking accep-
tance of the prejudice that homosexu-
ality is a sin. And the “consequences”
quadrant might reveal that the client
has been the target of hate-crimes in
his country of origin, which is gov-
erned by fundamentalist Muslims.
Taken together, the reasons that lie in
these two quadrants might outweigh
those provided by the lawyer’s core
values and past actions, prompting
her to describe the moral shape of the
situation in terms of a story that justi-
fies, in this instance, exhausting every
avenue of appeal.
Stories of value. If we are to be
morally intelligible to one another,
we must sustain or renew our under-
standing of moral terms—of what it
means to speak of respect, client well-
being, fidelity, or obligation. Often
we renew our understanding by
means of stories. When, for example,
an intern asks a resident why she
stopped her from discussing a pa-
tient’s case in the hospital corridor,
the resident is likely to reply, “Once
when I was on a surgical rotation, 
I . . .”
Throughout our lives we are con-
fronted by the problem of correctly
applying to new cases the values we
endorse and understand, or trying to
determine exactly what those values
really mean. “Learning to refrain
from dominating a child, conde-
scending to a student, or depending
too much on a partner,” Walker ob-
serves, “may involve a new or extend-
ed understanding of what respect or
self-respect can be. Terminating a
lengthy friendship may involve in-
sight into what friendship now
means, or what loyalty does not.”14
Many moral concepts have a familiar
set of applications that reflects the
history of the choices made under
them. Other concepts gradually lose
their moral force. The word bastard,
for example, as applied to a child
born of unmarried parents, has large-
ly lost its connotations of shame and
worthlessness, retaining them only in
certain isolated and highly conserva-
tive communities. The history of this
shift in moral meaning is precisely a
story—a story of value.
The nurse in our earliest example,
who believes that countenancing her
patient’s refusal to eat is the moral
equivalent of letting her starve to
death, may well find that her core be-
liefs and values accord with her ac-
tions. But like our immigration attor-
ney, when she moves to the “social
norms” quadrant, she might begin to
realize that how she applies the con-
cept “letting starve” is at odds with
social shifts in the moral understand-
ings that surround the care of the
dying. There, in the course of a guid-
ed reflection, she might come to see
that the only real alternative to letting
her patient starve is to supply nutri-
tion and hydration by inserting a na-
sogastric tube over her patient’s objec-
tions, and that this can be configured
as forcing unwanted medical treat-
ment on the patient. But forcing un-
wanted treatment violates the socially
shared principle of respect for pa-
tients’ autonomy. By the same token,
when she directs her attention to the
“consequences” quadrant, she may
see that keeping the NG tube in place
involves restraining the patient, so
that immobility is added to the bur-
den of prolonged dying. Here again
the reasons in the lower two quad-
rants of the Reflection Square could
outweigh those provided by the pro-
fessional’s core values and previous ac-
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tions, and the contours of the situa-
tion may be modeled by a narrative
that justifies withholding nutrition
and hydration.
Stories of identity, relationship,
and value are essential for keeping
our moral lives intelligible, both to
ourselves and among us. Each kind of
story is threaded through the others,
and they all wind in and out of the
narrative description of the morally
puzzling case. It is the coherence of
these narratives, and the connections
among them, that allows a group of
people to negotiate their professional
responsibilities.
An Ethics of Daily Practice
This article began with a descrip-tion of moral competence as the
ability to see what is morally relevant
in a given situation, knowing the par-
ticular point of view from which one
sees it, understanding that others
who are involved may see it some-
what differently, and then, with those
others, responding well to what one
sees. Our tool for ethics education
emphasizes these skills for a number
of reasons. 
First, in many cases moral prob-
lems are not recognized as moral. The
different opinions of the neonatolo-
gist, the NICU nurse, and the social
worker caring for the baby with very
low birth weight, for example, may
have registered as nothing more than
different opinions. The team mem-
bers could have worked together for
years without noticing that these dif-
ferent opinions were grounded in dif-
ferent perceptions of their profession-
al identities. In those years, however,
each of the professionals doubtless ex-
perienced frequent frustrations, re-
sulting in less competent care for the
young patients and their parents. See-
ing what is morally relevant thus
means that professionals become
aware of the many moral dimensions
of their work. This awareness results
in a heightened sense of how those
who engage in professional practice
shape and sustain it, as well as values
and beliefs that define it. 
Second, busy professionals are sel-
dom given the opportunity to reflect
on their practice, let alone to under-
stand their own perspective on that
practice. As a result, they may be
alienated from themselves, not know-
ing whether they are acting out of a
sense of their professional identities
or out of hospital or office routine.
Yet responsible professional practice
demands that one know one’s own
viewpoint. So we conceive of the re-
flection enhancement exercise as cre-
ating a moral space where profession-
als find the leisure, the structure, and
the responses of trustworthy others
that permit them to identify and de-
velop their own point of view.
Third, many people do not fully
appreciate the moral importance of
knowing the viewpoints of others in
addition to their own. Since our exer-
cise affords opportunities for profes-
sionals to listen to the stories that the
others create as they try to make sense
of a situation, to note how these sto-
ries can differ from their own, and to
construct stories in collaboration
with their colleagues, it reinforces the
idea that morality is something we do
together. 
Finally, the skills we emphasize do
not require a sophisticated under-
standing of philosophical moral theo-
ries. Instead, they encourage profes-
sionals to employ a kind of folk
methodology for understanding a
moral situation and responding, with
the other moral actors who inhabit
the situation, to what is there to be
seen. The response can be a concerted
effort, with all of the actors pulling
together in tandem to address the
client’s needs. Or it can be a coordi-
nated effort, with each actor doing
what his own professional identity
demands of him to bring about the
desired result. Either way, the re-
sponse is prompted by the reasons
there are for making it; and as the
philosopher Jonathan Dancy argues,
“To give those reasons is just to lay
out how one sees the situation, start-
ing in the right place and going on to
display the various salient features in
the right way.”15 Seeing, narrating,
and responding “in the right way”
takes patience and practice. Our hope
is that the professionals who hone
these skills will find that they have in-
deed enhanced their professional
competence.
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